INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION DISCIPLINES

Intelligence Collection Disciplines

Security is a fundamental objective of all states. The Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria 1990 (as amended) states that the primary aim of Government is security. To support that search for security, all nations use intelligence, to one degree or another, to enhance decision making. Intelligence therefore is concerned with the collection, analysis, production, communication and utilization of information about potential hostile states, groups, individuals, and activities. When intelligence services fail to provide the necessary ingredients for decision-makers to make informed-decisions, then something is wrong. One earliest outstanding feature of a failing state is the failure of its intelligence system.

There are several methods of collecting intelligence. Each method of intelligence collection is an intelligence discipline. These disciplines are generally categorized into Human Intelligence Collection (HUMINT) and Technical Intelligence Collection (TECHINT). Present Nigeria’s intelligence services can be described as far from being global in operations and structure. Even our regional and national intelligence interests are limited in almost all dimensions. Nigeria’s Military departments or departments of government responsible for the provision of intelligence required for military forces and their operations required urgent reorganization to keep up with the changing times. The same is applicable to all agencies responsible for collecting, analyzing, producing and communicating intelligence about domestic threats to security. Nigeria is fast growing and other states have their eyes on Nigeria. Nations around the world are not only competing on the socio-economic scales, but have perfected the art of turning disgruntled citizens of opponent nation against themselves to gain some real advantage over the enemy nation by accessing its secrets or destabilizing its internal systems . Therefore, our intelligence collection operations must be modernized, in depth, penetrating and extensive.

The following are the different ways of collecting intelligence known as intelligence disciplines:

1.     HUMINT

Human intelligence refers to information collected by intelligence officers. It involves the use of spies and requires men and women who know both the language and culture of the area to which they are assigned, who are comfortable living double life and can develop secure ways to exchange information in a manner that will not compromise the person providing it.

2.     TECHINT

Technical Intelligence initially means information about weapons systems but now it is used to refer to intelligence collected from the interception of a variety of electronic signals by the use of sophisticated technical means. Techint developed in response to three particular scientific and engineering advances namely: Development of wire-based electronic communications; Development of wireless electronic communications and Development of Aeroplane.

3.     SIGINT

Signal intelligence refers to all kinds of information collected through various electronic devices, including the following sub-disciplines:

4.     IMINT

Imagery intelligence means any photographic or digital images collected by orbiting (satellite) or ground-based (aeroplanes or unmanned Ariel Vehicles) systems.

5.     PHOTINT

Photographic intelligence was the earliest term for imagery intelligence used widely to describe both film and digital photographs taken from satellites.

6.     COMINT

Communication Intelligence refers to the interception of communications between two or more parties.

7.     TELINT

Telemetry Intelligence is the interception of data transmitted during the testing of various kinds of weapons systems.

8.     ELINT

Electronic Intelligence entails the interception of electronic emissions emanating from weapons and tracking systems.

9.     MASINT

Measures and Signatures Intelligence is a more recent form of SIGINT using more sophisticated device that can sense material used in various types of modern weapons.

10.RADINT

Radar Intelligence is concerned with information derived from the use of radar signals emanating from overhead satellites, aircrafts, or from ground-based sources.

11.      OSINT

Open Source Intelligence is the collection of intelligence information from a wide variety of publicly available sources (media, scholarly publications, government information and so on).

Let us conclude this discuss with a quote from the book, “The Art of War” by The Chinese General Sun Tzu (500 BC) as translated by Lionel Giles.

“What enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strive and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowledge. Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits; it cannot be obtained inductively from experience, nor by any deductive calculation. Knowledge of the enemy’s dispositions can only be obtained from other men. Therefore, enlightened rulers and good generals who are able to obtain intelligent agents as spies are certain for great achievements.

“If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear a hundred battles. If you know youself and not the enemy, for every victory you will suffer a defeat. If you know neither yourself nor the enemy, you are a fool and will meet defeat in every battle”.ollorwi.images

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CRUSHING BOKO HARAM WITH INTELLIGENCE

ollorwi.imagesCrushing Boko Haram WITH INTELLIGENCE

When the Nigeria-Biafra Civil War ended many thought that the country had been made a safer place, and the tendency was for Nigerians to relax about national security. But, as time has shown, the end of the 30 months Civil War merely revealed other deadly dangers. From countering the Kano Disturbances in 1980 to the Niger Delta militants that nearly crippled the nation’s economy, to an international web of terrorists seeking to undermine our culture and existence and campaigning to Islamize the country, the Nigerian military has not only been unable to relax, it has been forced to be more vigilant than ever.

Nigeria is prosecuting its first full-fledged military operations since the Nigeria-Biafra Civil War in 1970. Information emanating therefrom revealed that our army is geared to fight other armies. This accounts for why the war with Boko Haram has been so different and proving difficult for us.

Former President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan’s eleventh hour goal, crush Boko Haram within 6 weeks, before the 2015 general elections, failed. The President Muhammed Buhari government’s hope that bombing cities and towns of the northeastern Nigeria occupied by Boko Haram terrorists will defeat them also proves negative. Perhaps, the hit or miss strategy of President Jonathan worked in eliminating the original Abubakar Shekau, but was not effective in silencing the Boko Haram sect as the renew offensive by the group in recent times show.

Terrorism is a frontless battle. Terrorists all over the world are known to be very mobile; united by common ideology and adopt dynamic operational strategies. Like chameleon, they easily blend with their environment to carry out their evil.

As the ongoing war against Boko Haram demonstrates, the best way to prevent terrorism is to identify and kill the terrorists. Aggression remains the key to defeating terror. Recommending Vladimir Putin, President of Russia’s strategy against terrorism to Nigeria Femi Fani-Kayode said, the Russians have cultivated the courage to stop the pampering and to desist from trying to rationalize the evil of ISIS and the forces of terror. The Russians confronted and crushed the evil of terrorism in Chechnya, and now they are doing it in the Middle East.

While condemning President Barak Obama for encouraging and tolerating evil on the altar of political expediency and for supporting or covertly funding terrorists, Femi Fani-Kayode called on the international community to “encourage the Russians to keep the bombs flying and to send the demons to hell where they belong”.

He emphasized the need “for us to come together and cleanse our land of these godless creatures. They should be cleansed from the land and eliminated in the same way that cockroaches and rats are cleansed and eliminated from a filthy house”.

There is no other way better than to kill the killers. But, arms work only where intelligence is effective. Bombs that fly without solid intelligence to direct them usually end up destroying the crops instead of the weeds. Our security forces have erroneously relied heavily on information from purported escapees to their detriment. This information mostly belated, lacked real-time intelligence materials. Again, a situation where strategies and tactics are discussed in the news media does not paint our military in good picture.

During the America-British War of 1812 the Americans made a grave mistake that change the face of intelligence protection. During the lager part of that war it was unnecessary for the British to spy on the U.S. to find out what they were planning. The US was giving information away. In the first two years of the war, American Newspapers regularly published accounts of troops’ movements, official military correspondence, and letters from officers describing operations and actions. Naturally, British generals read these papers, which became a prime source of intelligence.

By 1814 the problem was so severe that the US Army had to publish an order forbidding the publication of military information in Newspapers. Ever since, the US military and the press have worked hand in hand during times of conflict. The US press remains free, but not at the cost of American lives to enemy attack. Information for public consumption must be separated from information for military use.

Our spies must intensify clandestine operations. Boko Haram can only be wiped out of Nigeria by some clever intelligence work, telemarketing campaigns that sell the leaders on the benefits of surrender; and which also unearths detailed information about the sect; and direct the bombs appropriately on target.

Disinformation must be encouraged and pursued. False information must be disseminated to mislead the enemy commanders into making the wrong moves so that they could be more easily defeated.

The fragmentation of databases by our law enforcement and intelligence gathering agencies is unhealthy for the nation’s efforts towards protecting the nation from the forces of destruction. The tasks that our military and intelligence community currently face are enormous:

  1. Routing out and destroying terrorist cells;
  2. Improving security at our seaports, airports and on commercial airlines;
  3. Training and equipping those responsible to terrorist attacks;
  4. Reducing the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit;
  5. Improving security at our borders; and protecting potential sites of terrorist attacks.

One of the toughest jobs facing the DSS today is routing out Boko Haram and ISIS cells that may already be in place in several cities and towns of Nigeria, especially southern Nigeria. Reports have apparently established a clear link between Boko Haram and ISIS. In August, 2015 ISIS leader, Chief Imam Ahmed Al-Assir was arrested trying to fly into Nigeria via Cairo, on a fake Palestinian travel documents. Between July and August, 2015 several members of the Boko Haram sect were arrested across the country. One Usman Shuaibu known as Money and other frontline members of the group were arrested in Lagos, Enugu, Plateau, Gombe and Kano. Shuaibu admitted being the leader of the team of Boko Haram members that was dispatched from Sambisa Forest to carry out several attacks. He disclosed that 4 out of the 9 members’ team were used as suicide bombers in executing all the recent suicide attacks.

Just yesterday, the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Lt. Gen. Tukur Bruatai while addressing troops in Lagos revealed that commanders of Boko Haram and some of its foot soldiers have infiltrated Lagos and other southern states. He hinted that security agents have already arrested a handful of the terrorists.

Recently, residents of Jos were warned to be alert following intelligent report that Boko Haram is planning to attack Jos. Crushing Boko Haram aggressively depends on the military’s ability to know more about the sect than the sect does about the military.

The DSS must be granted authority NOW to question as many northerners living outside their place of origin in a search for potential terrorist cells, spies, or people who might provide information helpful to the Nigerian military war effort. It may sound selective but necessary for security reasons.

The war against terrorism in the northeastern Nigeria has dislodged many terrorists, including Muslim fundamentalists and their sympathizers from the area and are now scattered all over the country.

Therefore, agents across the country should beef up efforts at interviewing this people in their homes, where they work, study, relax or do business. The DSS should be looking for three things:

  1. Potential terrorists – search for any links with Boko Haram, ISIS and possibly sympathetic radical Muslim groups.
  2. People with no known address and no known means of livelihood who relocated to their present station recently must be interrogated for the information they may have.
  3. Those who might be interested in helping Nigeria eliminate Boko Haram.

The DSS agents must know that the interviews are to be voluntary and to assure people that the government will protect them from any anti-Boko Haram backlash. The interviewees should also be assured that they would not be sent back to their home town.

The war against terrorism is a global war but each country’s terrorist group has its peculiarity in terms of the group’s characteristics, definition and selection of targets, methods of attack and above all, set goals. Set goals or demands of terrorist groups are important elements in the overall strategy to defeating the group. Where these goals or demands are not tenable like the ones advanced by Boko Haram, total elimination of the group is the best bet.

Intelligence holds the key to success or otherwise of any military operation. The subtle art of intelligence gathering and sophistical methods of deceiving the enemy often determines the outcome of key battles. Knowing where the enemy was going to be, when they were going to be there, and how many of them would be there, while keeping your own location and number secret, often made the difference. But, because the raw intelligence that led to victory was never publicly stated, historians tend to interpret the behavior of the confronting armies without taking intelligence into consideration.

The importance of intelligence was aptly demonstrated during the second war with Iraq. In addition to covert operations, there were huge intelligence gathering operations designed to facilitate the capture or assassination of Saddam Hussein. One method the US adopted was the monitoring of communications of Saddam’s bodyguards in an attempt to fix his location. The forces were also aided from above by a surveillance airplane known as River Joint. Despite efforts to hunt down Saddam Hussein, the US forces inside Iraq were also assembled a guerrilla forces of Kurdish dissidents, and woo Iraqi tribal and military leaders to defect, and monitored the movements of the Iraqi National Guards.

The second war against Iraq which featured both air and ground operations and which saw the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime by force was with minimum casualties and shorter period. The prolonged house-by-house fighting to capture Baghdad that had been feared did not materialize. The reason: the solid work of US intelligence. American spies were in Baghdad long before the war began, contacting religious, military and government leaders, explaining the gains of non-resistance once the war start.

How did American spies get into Baghdad? Many anti-war Americans travelled to Iraq to serve as “human shields”. Some of these orchestrated human shields were CIA agents armed with cell phones, laptop computers, and an impressive rolodex. Once in Iraq, they began what amounted to a telemarketing campaign, calling Iraqi leaders and selling them on the benefits of surrender.

In the national security business, you never can be sure who your friends are. National interest determines what happens at any point in time. Nigeria as a strong force and voice in the Multinational Joint Task Force, comprising troops from Chad, Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon and Benin, set up to fight Boko Haram Islamists should see beyond a Nigerian Boko Haram and focused on fighting a multinational Boko Haram terrorist group that has link with ISIS and other enemies of the country.

As pointed out earlier, conventional armies geared to fight other armies find it difficult to fight terrorists, without retraining, reorientation, and motivation. Towards this end, President Muhammed Buhari should create a Special Operations Command of well trained, equipped and motivated soldiers and grant them authority to conduct regional and global operations against terrorist networks.

The Special Operations Command should be empowered with men, technology, fund and other resources to plan and carry out certain missions, covert operations, and quick strikes with “hunter-killer” teams, independent of the current established combatant commands.

These missions, of course will be tightly coordinated with the NIA and DSS operations. It also calls for prior diplomatic arrangements so that covert operations can enter countries quickly, carryout their mission, and promptly exits.

Personal interests of our leaders and fear of coup have robbed this country of viable security institutions. What happen to the Nigeria National Guards which was conceived in 1989 to be a Rapid Response Force to deal with emergencies, but killed and buried in 1993 under conflicting circumstances? My expectations, like that of many Nigerians, that the 7 Division of the Nigerian Army created in the peak of the war against Boko Haram will be a Special Operations Command was dashed when it turned out to be another regular Division of the Nigerian Army with no specialty.

Now that coups and the fear of coups in Nigeria are history can we look at national security for what it is? National security goes beyond mounting sentries at your borders and moving inside your country accusing citizens of aiding and abetting terrorism and intimidating them. Our agents must be equipped and encouraged to move out. Russians has a successful record of fighting terrorism because apart from combing its cities and towns for information of security interest, it also snoops around the world for intelligence. Our battles for security must be fought away from home; guided by the three keys to national security which have never changed since the origin of conflict:

  1. Maintain a strong military defense;
  2. Acquire the capacity to learn the secrets of enemies and potential enemies; and
  3. Keep our own secrets secret.

Nigeria must begin to exert and exercise her dominance powers in the West Africa sub-region and beyond, security wise.

Protecting Nigerian Industry against External Aggression

Protecting Nigerian Industry against External Aggression

Presenting a keynote address at a three-day industrial security and loss prevention management workshop organized by the Nigerian Institute of Security (NIS) recently at Presidential Hotel, Port Harcourt the former Chief Judge of Rivers State, Hon. Justice Iche N. Ndu said, “It is my thesis that industrial security is national security, and industrial insecurity begets, not only economic insecurity and destabilization, but also political insecurity and instability”. Coded in these words are challenges to Nigerian leaders, policymakers and security professionals to evolve measures for internal and external process of effective industrial security management for improved functionality and success in the development of the nation’s industrial base, thus promoting sustainable national economic growth and development.
Nigeria has enjoyed relative peace from external military aggression. Nations at war employ all available means, including industrial sabotage to gain an advantage. However, we must realize that in modern times the term “war” does not typically refer to military confrontation. Economic wars are more prevalent these days. As at now, there is a relentless, massive, unceasing, and evil war mounted by the industrialized countries against the developing nations. The war is conducted in an atmosphere termed “peaceful coexistence” because it does not boom, grind and clatter. It is cool but devastating, silent but horrible, paralyzing economics and destroying nations.
Nigeria has been at the receiving end of this cool but evil war. The story of Ajaokuta Steel Mills is a case in point. The circle of Nigeria’s exploit into the steel world has been endless and the waste monumental. Our once promising National Fertilizer Company of Nigeria (NAFCON) and hopeful Eleme Petrochemicals Company of Nigeria Limited (EPCL) collapsed in mysterious circumstances. Today, these companies are up and doing, in foreign hands, producing at full capacity and maximizing profits. Our four refineries are not only moribund but have also become drain pipes for siphoning our national resources. Nigeria, apart from importing refined petroleum products from abroad forces her citizens to pay for the products through their nose. The security implications of zero industrial base economy, poor governance and frustrated citizenry are very much with us today.
The Nigerian Enterprise Promotion Act of 1977 (otherwise known as the Indigenization Decree) was intended to protect Nigerian’s industries by putting many businesses which were hitherto in the hands of foreigners in the hands of Nigerians. This good intention was soon defeated by a sudden upsurge in government revenue from oil, which saw the economy becoming suddenly over liquid plus its concomitant problems of how to organize the newly acquired business to avoid disruption and possible collapse that the unplanned changes in management caused; and the problem of how to cope with the runaway inflation which had badly eroded the purchasing power of the Naira. The worsened general economic conditions soon after the 30 months Nigerian-Biafra War of 1967 – 1970 coupled with lack of necessary goods; the realization of extreme sacrifice; and spreading disappointment and discontent caused insecurity of lives and properties to rise.
In the interplay of these factors, the unseen hands of our enemies were at work to reverse the indigenization doctrine and make Nigeria a dumping ground for foreign goods perpetually. Today, we are back to square one. Through the Bureau of Public Enterprises, we have sold everything to foreigners except the Presidency. We import everything, including toxic waste. Because the developed world would not want Nigeria to be detached from their apron strings, they would continue to do everything possible to sabotage any meaningful developmental efforts in the direction of heavy industries.
For instance, the doctrine of Local Content is another carefully orchestrated publicity campaign mounted by the multinational oil companies (MOCs) over 40 years after oil was discovered and exported from Nigeria without any meaningful achievement in terms of improvement in the infrastructural and industrial base of the country. In the Norwegian North Sea, it did not take more than two years for the country to take over the control of the national oil industry. Although the government initially placed a 30 percent local content clause in all contracts in the petroleum industry, in less than five years the local content was 100 percent. In other words, the Norwegians are in full control of their oil industry. They were never dictated to by anybody. The multinational oil companies merely provided the capital and expertise to kick-start the industry. The Norwegians take over as soon as they could raise the financial muscle.
The Nigerian case is pathetic. It is a case of one step forward and two steps backward. About forty-seven years after oil was discovered and exported from Nigeria, the Petroleum Industry Bill is still battling to see the light of day. The same people who have been working against indigenous takeover of the Nigerian oil industry are doing everything possible to frustrate the passage of the original PIB into law.
The matter does not end with the oil industry. It is common knowledge that foreign government knows more about Nigeria secrets than the Nigerian Government, be it social, industrial, political or economic information. For example, nobody in Nigeria can say with any measure of certainty that when the British left the shores of Nigeria they handed over all the information they obtained about the country’s mineral resources. The situation may be illustrated by a story told by the Principal of a Secondary School in one of the Western states. He narrated how he observed and watched two white men and a black man for several days while they used certain implements to dig and extract something from a hillside near his School. One day, out of curiosity, he went up to them and enquired what they were doing. Actually, he thought that they were deployed by the Government to carry out one type of project or the other. The intruders did not reply. Instead they disappeared from the site. When after many weeks they did not return, he became suspicious and reported the matter to the Local Government Headquarters. Further investigation revealed that those men were actually digging for gold.
Where did these people obtain the information that led them to know exactly at what point to mine for gold? The chances are that they must have obtained the information from somewhere in the archives of their native country. But then, even that fact would be less important than the realization that these men had the audacity to come right into the heart of the country and hired a local guide to help them locate where to dig. How many more of this sort of thing goes on in this country on a daily basis? Are we really in control of Nigeria? How secure are our secrets? How protected are our intelligence?
In the educational arena the story is the same. it is difficult for a Nigerian student to obtain data from one of the many multinational oil companies (MOCs) for an academic research than for a Camel to pass through the eye of a needle. The foreign company would instantly show him out of the gate on the grounds that such information is well-preserved and guarded company’s secrets. But, the student’s counterpart in the US or Europe would go to any library and lift exactly the same information about Nigerian petroleum industry right out of the bookshelf.
Similarly, if a helicopter lifts off from Yaoundé in Cameroon a drops in Kuru near Jos in Plateau State or from Niamey in Niger Republic and drops in Eleme in Rivers State, how many Nigerians, when they see the helicopter fly across, would give it a second thought? I doubt if anyone will. But such an event is not only momentous, it could be destructive. It could also mean the life and death of a nation. How much of Nigerian borders is actually policed? How many immigrants are documented and monitored as they walk across the nook and cranny of the country daily?
Nigeria is surrounded by black African countries – Benin, Niger Republic, Chad, and Cameroon. Now, if anyone has a reason to spy in Nigeria would he not sponsor black Africans simply to work across our borders and do their dirty jobs? When we use the term “foreigner” in Nigeria, we are always thinking about white people, or discernible light-skinned people like the Arabs. Meanwhile, the nation could be overrun by black foreigners. For example, the disturbances in Kano from December 18 to 29, 1980 in which 4,177 people were killed and the economic life of Kano city completely paralyzed was masterminded by Maitasine alias Muhammadu Marwa, an indigene of Marwa in the Cameroon Republic. It is also widely believed that the now lateleader of the terrorists group, Boko Haram, Abubakar Shekau that has killed almost 5, 000 people and is disrupting the commercial and industrial life of northeastern Nigeria since 2009 was from Niger Republic. If the invaders were originally folks seeking for their livelihood, no one would be much agitated. The real threat is when the invaders have sinister motives like the instances cited.
Again, if you discover Uranium at Eleme, how do you know that the next “village man” you see around Eleme is not a spy? He might as well speak Eleme Language, dress like the Elemes, and indeed live in Eleme for over ten years without anyone realizing that this man is gunning for our Uranium.
I do not know much of what Nigerian immigration laws say, but I know that in Scandinavia, the immigrant is made to report to the local police in any town he intends to stay for more than one week. If his stay in that locality will be more than two weeks, he will need to obtain a new residential permit to do so. As you move from town to town, or from locality to locality, the police keep tag of your movements and update their records. You are constantly under surveillance, even when they are satisfied that you are a harmless fellow.
Counter-industrial-espionage entails both the measures a nation takes to protect its secret industrial information, and the method of identifying and dealing with those who want to obtain such information through covert operations. The former is easier to do than the latter. The former is passive while the latter is active. Does Nigeria have what it takes to engage in meaningful active counterespionage activities? Is our security apparatus organized and equipped with the appropriate tools, manpower, expertise, and charged with the responsibility of providing us with an envelope of protection through the functionalities of planning and direction, collection, processing, all-source analysis and production, and dissemination of intelligence? How many of our corporate organizations maintain an effective in-house security department with a functional Business Intelligence Section? Where such department or Unit exists, how much attention is paid to: –
• Current Intelligence – which follows day-to-day events,
• Estimative Intelligence – which looks at what might be or what might happen,
• Warning Intelligence – which gives notice to Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) or Policymakers that something urgent might happen that may require their immediate attention,
• Research Intelligence – which is an in-depth study of an issue, and
• Scientific Intelligence – which is information on foreign technologies?
Counterintelligence, the science of preventing enemies or competitors from learning about our secrets has grown both in scope and applications. It is either you can ensure that your secrets are very difficult to discover, or you can impede the effort of those who want to learn those secrets by snooping around. Although human beings still play prominent roles in gathering intelligence, electronic listening and seeing devices are now leading the race thus affording industrialized world added advantage over developing countries. Today, the security of some of our most cherished secrets that we hitherto enjoy are fast whittling away by technology. It is also true that the more publicly available information about us the more vulnerable we are to attacks.
Privatizing and commercializing all our ailing industrial and commercial concerns is not the solution to Nigeria’s industrialization problems. Our industries need protection; our markets need security. There is no disputing the fact that Nigeria is one of the world’s best-performing markets. According to the report written by Hilary Kramer and published in Forbes, an authoritative US Journal, “Nigeria was one of the world’s four best-performing markets in 2012 with a 35.45 percent gain and is the biggest and most dynamic frontier economy in Africa, with a GDP at par with global capitals like Hong Kong and Singapore”. Kramer noted that, “The Nigeria economy is growing at an annualized rate well above six percent, faster than any of the top-tier emerging markets”. The invisible growth is both frustrating and confusing. Where is all the accruable wealth? What percentage of the profits remains in Nigeria to develop our industrial base or are the profits exported in hundredfold to the foreign investors’ countries to strengthen their economy the more while we compound the problem of a “fast-growing economy” while the citizens suffer under the oppressive hands of poverty and frustration? Our market needs protection just as the citizenry request that their “security and welfare” be the primary concern of their Government.
What makes a nation thick is its ability to maintain a strong security defense; demonstrate the capability to learn the secrets of enemies (both real and potential); and exhibit the know-how to keep its secrets secret.
As we develop and advance in science and technology and play increasing roles in the international scene, we need to establish measures to protect our industries from both external and internal meddlesomeness. We must protect what we have as we move to where we want to be. In doing this, we must maintain a strong security defense, continually learning the secrets of our real and potential enemies and keep our own secrets secret.